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THE NEW WORLD ORDER: FINANCIAL
GUARANTY COMPANY RESTRUCTURING
AND TRADITIONAL INSURANCE
INSOLVENCY PRINCIPLES
Bill Goddard*
INTRODUCTION
For over a century, insurance company receivership in the United States
has looked much the same. The affairs of insurance companies are
concluded or “wound up” in a receivership proceeding by the state
insurance regulator under the supervision of a state court. The proceeding is
long, cumbersome, and strictly statutory. Most celebrated insurance
insolvency cases are either large life insurance company failures that burn
brightly and then flame out, or property casualty failures that seemingly
smolder forever in the morass of long-tailed asbestos or environmental
claims. In the last two years, however, a strange breed of insurance
company, the financial guaranty company, has come under attack. Huge
exposures to residential mortgage-backed investments swamped their
traditional business of guaranteeing the principal and interest payments on
municipal bonds. These cases have changed the entire rubric of insurance
insolvency. The traditional rules about the relative priorities of creditors,
the benchmarking of the rehabilitation proceedings against liquidation
valuations, the encroaching federal influence in a state process, and the
sanctity of the aleatory contract between a carrier and its insured have all
been tested. Before discussing the financial guarantors, it is helpful to first
look at the historical framework of insurance insolvency.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP
The insurance regulatory system in the United States is governed,
almost entirely, by state law. This system developed immediately following
the U.S. Civil War when the U.S. Supreme Court declared that insurance
regulation was beyond the reach of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers.
The Court reasoned that the sale of insurance was not “a transaction of
commerce.”1 In 1944, the Supreme Court reversed this decision,
*
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1. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
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recognizing that insurance did, in fact, constitute interstate commerce, and
could therefore be regulated by Congress.2 In response, Congress rapidly
passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act (McCarran-Ferguson or the Act), which
codified the primacy of state insurance regulation.3
The Act recognizes the authority of state insurance laws over federal
laws in most circumstances. Specifically, the Act prevents the preemption
of state insurance laws by federal laws that are not specifically targeted at
insurance. The Act states in pertinent part, “No Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a
fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance . . . .”4
Each state has its own system for administering an insolvent insurance
company. The systems adopted by various states, however, are quite similar
because they are based on model laws. Moreover, states frequently adopt
the language of other states’ legislation. The model laws are promulgated
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC),5 and the
National Conference of Insurance Legislators, 6 in an attempt to make the
system more uniform. The NAIC has historically proposed, and many states
have adopted, the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Model Act.7
More recently, however, the NAIC has promulgated the Insurance
Receivership Model Act, which has only been adopted by a few states.8
While any participant in a proceeding in a particular state must be familiar
with that state’s laws, the model laws may serve as a guide for what may be
encountered at the state level.
There are essentially two basic types of judicial proceedings that a
troubled insurer may be ordered into. The first type of proceeding is a
reorganization of the company wherein it continues to operate under court
supervision.9 This type of proceeding is called a “rehabilitation” or
“conservation,” depending on the state. While the insurer continues to
operate, a receiver (generally an agent of the state insurance commissioner)
displaces management. Historically, few insurers emerge from
rehabilitation, despite the name of the procedure. Once an insurer loses

2.
3.
4.
5.

See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1945).
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
See generally Model Categories Index, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naic.org/committees_index_model_description.htm (last visited
Dec. 23, 2011).
6. See generally History and Purpose, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF INSURANCE
LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncoil.org/ncoilinfo/about.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
7. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-903 (2009).
8. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 443.001 (West 2007).
9. See Carpenter v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 74 P.2d 761, 774–75 (Cal. 1937); see also Foster
v. Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 614 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Pa. 1992).
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public confidence, it is hard to regain it.10 Rehabilitation, although different
in many ways, is somewhat analogous to a corporate reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The second form of proceeding consists of a court-supervised winding
up and liquidation of the insurer.11 In a liquidation proceeding, notice is
provided to policyholders that their policies will be cancelled. Then,
reinsurance is collected, assets are liquidated, and creditors are paid
according to specific statutory priorities. Liquidation bears some
resemblance to an insurance liquidation proceeding in the United Kingdom
or a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.12 As noted
below, one of the fundamental differences between these proceedings and a
corporate bankruptcy is the priority given to policyholder claims over the
claims of most other creditors.
Of great importance is the priority structure that governs the order in
which claims are paid. One priority level must be fully discharged before
the next can be paid. The system can vary from state to state, but the
general structure remains the same.13 Like bankruptcy, the expenses of
administration are paid first and equity holders are paid last.14 The
similarity, however, ends there. In many states, expenses of the state
guaranty fund come second, followed by policyholder claims and
policyholder-related claims of the guaranty funds.15 Next come the federal
government claims and certain limited employee claims.16 Finally, after a
small number of miscellaneous government claims are paid, the general
creditors are paid.17 This class typically includes ceding insurance
companies that were reinsured by the failed insurer.18 The priority of
reinsurance creditors is uniform across all states, but some states explicitly
relegate reinsurance creditors to general creditor priority by statute, while
others rely on the common law.19 The last time a state court deviated from
this principle, that court’s decision was promptly reversed on appeal.20
10. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 441.001(a) (West 2007) (“An insurer delinquency, or the
state’s inability to properly proceed in a threatened delinquency, directly or indirectly affects other
insurers by creating a lack of public confidence in insurance and insurers.”).
11. See In re Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co., 947 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (N.Y. 2011) (discussing
liquidation).
12. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–785 (2006), with The Insurers (Winding Up) Rules, 2001, S.I.
2001/3635 (U.K.).
13. Compare N.Y. INS. LAW § 7434 (McKinney 2005) (requiring the payment to state and
local governments ahead of general creditors), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-944 (2009) (having
a separate class for administrative expenses of insurance guaranty associations).
14. Compare N.Y. INS. LAW § 7434(a)(1)(i), with 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(C).
15. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 7434(a)(1)(ii).
16. See id. § 7434(a)(1)(iii)–(iv).
17. See id. § 7434(a)(1)(vi).
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Covington v. Ohio Gen. Ins. Co., No. 01AP-213, 2001 WL 1013126 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 6, 2001), rev’d, 99 Ohio St. 3d 117 (2003).
20. See id.
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Finally, as noted above, equity holders come last.21 The U.S. government
has consistently challenged any exceptions to the Federal Priority Statute,22
a statute that grants the government first priority in all insolvencies outside
those governed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.23 The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, held that under certain state statutes that protect insurance
policyholders, states may prioritize policyholders over the federal
government.24
A common aspect of the insurance insolvency system in the United
States is the supremacy of the state receivership court. State insurance
statutes generally prohibit the bringing of any type of action against an
insolvent insurer in any court other than the state receivership court
administering the insolvency.25 Removal to a federal court is generally not
available because of the primacy of state regulation under McCarranFerguson.26
II. THE BOND INSURERS CHANGE THE GAME
When we think about financial guaranty insurance companies, two
large players come to mind: the American Municipal Bond Assurance
Corporation and the Municipal Bond Insurance Association. These
organizations were founded in the 1970s to provide credit enhancement for
municipal bonds. These entities guaranteed the payment of interest and
principal when a municipality was unable to meet the debt service on its
bonds.27 This development aided small or more risky public finance issuers’
ability to tap the capital markets using the highest credit rating—Aaa from
Moody’s or AAA from Standard and Poor’s (S&P).28 Thus, bond liquidity
increased as more buyers became eligible.29 Over time, one of these two
giants became Ambac Assurance Corporation. Eventually, other companies
joined this business, including the Financial Guaranty Insurance Company,
Financial Security Assurance (now known as Assured Guaranty Municipal
Corp.), Syncora (formerly known as XL Capital Assurance, Inc.), Radian
Asset Assurance Inc. (formerly part of Enhance Financial Services Group,
Inc.), CIFG Assurance North America, Inc., ACA Financial Guaranty
Corp., and Assured Guaranty Ltd.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3713(a) (2000).
Id.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 492 (1993).
See Knickerbocker Agency, Inc. v. Holz, 149 N.E.2d 885, 890 (N.Y. 1958) (“Hence other
courts, except when called upon by the court of primary jurisdiction for assistance, are excluded
from participation.”).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
27. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901 (McKinney 2005).
28. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 14, In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-00411) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint].
29. Id.
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The basic business of a bond insurer relies on its high credit rating.30
The credit rating models, however, put significant emphasis on size and
market share.31 With the municipal bond business experiencing limited
growth and increased competition, the financial guaranty companies looked
for new ways to grow. They began to provide their guaranties to
securitizations of many asset classes—most significantly, residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).32 They also began to provide credit
protection to various financial counterparties in the form of credit default
swaps (CDSs).33 These swaps referenced single credits or, alternatively,
pools of assets, which were often synthetic and referencing RMBS.34 Since
insurance companies generally cannot enter into derivative transactions
without hedging investment exposure,35 the financial guaranty companies
formed subsidiaries that entered into CDSs with sophisticated financial
counterparties. The insurance entity would then provide a guaranty of its
subsidiary’s performance under the CDS.36
When the RMBS market began to disintegrate, the financial guaranty
companies began to stumble because they were exceptionally leveraged to
these securities, thereby launching a vicious cycle of credit rating
downgrades. These downgrades had a number of consequences, including a
loss of new business, and the establishment of requirements to post
collateral in transactions that required additional collateral upon downgrade
of the financial guarantor.37 Moreover, sometimes CDSs came with
penalties for rating downgrades and very expensive mark-to-market
damages upon early termination.38

30. Id. at 14–18.
31. ARLENE ISAACS-LOWE

ET AL., MOODY’S RATING METHODOLOGY FOR THE FINANCIAL
GUARANTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY REPORT NO. 98408 6–7 (Moody’s Investors Service Sept.
2006).
32. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 28, at 3; Disclosure Statement Accompanying
Plan of Rehabilitation at 3–4, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance
Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Disclosure
Statement].
33. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 35 (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Ambac
2007 10-K].
34. Class Action Complaint, supra note 28, at 23.
35. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 1410 (McKinney 2005).
36. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Bank Insureds at 1–3, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account
of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter Bank of Insureds Amicus Brief].
37. Brief in Opposition to RMBS Policyholders’ and LVM Bondholders’ Emergency Motions
for Injunctive and Other Relief at 13, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac
Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. May 20, 2010); Ambac 2007 10-K,
supra note 33, at 25, 29.
38. When a swap is terminated early, the transaction is generally termed “mark-to-market,”
meaning that a market valuation is made of the trade and any deficit found is payable
immediately. When the RMBS crisis was at its bottom, the value of swap protection was very high
because there was no market price for the underlying collateral. Even though many observers
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Financial guaranty companies also had financial services businesses
that provided guaranteed investment contracts or similar investment
vehicles.39 These services provided vehicles for municipalities to invest
proceeds from bond offerings and for synthetic securitizations to place
funds raised, which would be available to pay losses if these were to
occur.40 These contracts could also require posting of collateral in the event
that the financial guaranty company providing the product experienced
credit rating downgrades.41
The financial guaranty companies faced losses on guarantees of RMBS,
losses on CDSs referencing RMBS, and cash crunches resulting from credit
rating downgrades.42 With these macro forces in mind, let us examine
Wisconsin-domiciled Ambac Assurance Corporation (Ambac Assurance or
together with its affiliates, Ambac).
III. WISCONSIN DIVIDES AMBAC
Wisconsin-domiciled Ambac Assurance Corporation suffered from the
decline in value of RMBS. Ambac began as part of the mortgage insurer
MGIC Investment Corp. (MGIC), whose brush with the Baldwin United
fiasco in the early 1980s spun it off on its own independent course. Ambac
prospered over the following quarter century until 2008 brought trouble.
Today, Ambac is a subsidiary of Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (Ambac
Financial or AFG).43
The year 2008 was not kind to Ambac. In late 2007, both major rating
agencies affirmed Ambac’s AAA ratings, but both warned of future
downgrades.44 On June 5, 2008, S&P downgraded Ambac Assurance’s
financial strength rating to AA, placing it on Credit Watch Negative.45 On
June 19, 2008, Moody’s downgraded it to Aa3 with a negative outlook.46
On November 5, 2008, Moody’s downgraded Ambac Assurance’s financial
strength rating to Baa1, and on November 19, 2008, S&P lowered its rating
of Ambac Assurance to A with a negative outlook.47

believed the market would recover before swaps expired, if a valuation was done at the bottom of
the crisis, a substantial amount could be due upon termination.
39. Ambac 2007 10-K, supra note 33, at 27–30.
40. Id. at 29–30.
41. Id. at 25.
42. Id.
43. See generally Ambac Financial Group, Inc., ANSWERS.COM, http://www.answers.com
/topic/ambac-financial-group-inc (last visited Oct. 1, 2011); see also Ambac Financial Group,
Inc., FUNDINGUNIVERSE.COM, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Ambac-Finan
cial-Group-Inc-Company-History.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (providing a history of Ambac).
44. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Ambac
2008 10-K].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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These rating downgrades took their toll on Ambac. The December 31,
2008 Ambac Assurance statutory statements show well over $1 billion
flowing from Ambac Assurance to its affiliates, much of it to collateralize
guaranteed investment contracts and other transactions requiring collateral
after Ambac was downgraded.48
In order to permit Ambac’s non-insurance affiliates to meet the collateral posting obligations, Ambac Assurance asked its regulator, the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI or the Commissioner), to
permit certain “liquidity enhancing activities” between the non-insurance
affiliates and the regulated insurance company. Finally, in early November
2008, the OCI granted Ambac a “non-disapproval letter” with regard to a
few liquidity-transferring transactions between a number of Ambac’s affiliates and the insurance company. These included:
Ambac Assurance is permitted to purchase up to $3.0 billion of investment
securities presently owned by the investment agreement business;
Ambac Assurance is permitted to provide a revolving unsecured credit
facility to the investment agreement business of up to $1.6 billion for the
purpose of providing such affiliates liquidity for collateral postings or
liquidation of investment agreements;
Ambac Assurance is permitted to provide a revolving unsecured credit
facility to Ambac Financial Services of not more than $750 million
(subsequently increased to $850 million through March 31, 2009) for the
purpose of providing liquidity for collateral postings or liquidation of
interest rate and/or currency swap arrangements; and
Under a separate non-disapproval, Ambac Assurance is permitted to lend
up to $1.3 billion to the investment agreement business on a secured
basis.49

Ambac responded by discontinuing its credit derivatives business50 and
announcing that it would attempt to revitalize a subsidiary called
“Everspan” to write municipal finance guarantees.51
Ambac tried to resuscitate itself; in 2008, Ambac Financial issued $1.25
billion of common stock and $250 million of hybrid securities (comprised
of a commitment to purchase common stock and approximately $240
million in 9.5 percent senior notes) and raised $800 million from their
contingent capital facilities.52 They put virtually all of this capital into its
subsidiaries, including Ambac Assurance.53

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

AMBAC ASSURANCE CORP., 2008 ANNUAL STATEMENT 14.4 (2008).
Ambac 2008 10-K, supra note 44, at 56.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 93, 99.
Id. at 172.
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The flow of outbound claim payments could not be staunched. Between
2003 and 2007, Ambac had only paid $177 million in gross claims, but in
2008 alone, it paid $638 million, and recorded loss and loss adjustment
expenses totaling $2.2 billion.54 In 2009, Ambac paid $1.7 billion, and
recorded loss and loss adjustment expenses totaling $2.8 billion ($589
million and $1.4 billion in 2008 and 2009, respectively, on a statutory
basis).55 Ambac’s balance sheet crumbled. Investment losses on a statutory
basis were $3.9 billion in 2008 and another $2.6 billion in 2009.56
In March 2010, facing continued losses and deteriorating conditions,
Ambac’s regulator, the OCI, responded by causing Ambac to form a
“segregated account” (the Segregated Account).57 Life insurance companies
commonly employ “separate accounts” to separate assets (generally on a
small scale) for self-managed variable annuities or similar products.58 The
assets in the separate account cannot be used to satisfy the general
obligations of the insurer. Wisconsin’s segregated account statute59 was
used in the final stages of the spectacular failure of Baldwin United that
gave rise to the current MGIC and its former subsidiary Ambac.60 Under
this construct, an insurer can separate an entire part of its business, not just
individual accounts as described above. This is required for certain lines of
business, including mortgage guaranty and financial guaranty lines. It is
optional in other circumstances:
(2) Optional segregated accounts. With the approval of the
commissioner, a corporation may establish a segregated account for any
part of its business. The commissioner shall approve unless he or she finds
that the segregated account would be contrary to the law or to the interests
of any class of insureds.61

When a segregated account is formed from an existing business, it must
have “adequate” capital and surplus:
(3) Special provisions for segregated accounts. (a) Capital and surplus.
The commissioner shall specify in the certificate of authority of a newly
organized corporation the minimum capital or the minimum permanent

54. Id. at 88–89.
55. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 84 (Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Ambac
2009 10-K]; AMBAC ASSURANCE CO., 2009 ANNUAL STATEMENT 5 (2009) [hereinafter AMBAC
2009 ANNUAL STATEMENT].
56. AMBAC 2009 ANNUAL STATEMENT, supra note 55, at 4.
57. Brief in Support of Entry of Order for Rehabilitation at 3–4, In re The Rehab. of
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar.
24, 2010) [hereinafter Rehab. Brief].
58. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 4240 (McKinney 2005).
59. WIS. STAT. § 611.24(2) (2010).
60. Notice and Verified Motion for Approval of Creation of Segregated Account at 2, 6, 8, In
re The Liquidation of WMBIC Indemnity Corp., No. 85-CV-3361 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Sept.
21, 1990).
61. WIS. STAT. § 611.24(2).
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surplus and the initial expendable surplus to be provided for each
segregated account. If a segregated account is established after a
certificate of authority has been issued, the commissioner shall require the
corporation to have and maintain an adequate amount of capital and
surplus in the segregated account.62

Wisconsin treats the segregated account as an independent insurance
subsidiary for the purposes of a rehabilitation proceeding under
Wisconsin’s insolvency statutes.
(e) Delinquency proceedings. Each segregated account shall be deemed an
insurer within the meaning of s. 645.03(1)(f). A liquidation order under s.
645.42 for the general account or for any segregated account shall have
effect as a rehabilitation order under s. 645.32 for all other accounts of the
corporation. Claims remaining unpaid after completion of the liquidation
under ch. 645 shall have liens on the interests of shareholders, if any, in all
of the corporation’s assets that are not liquidated, and the rehabilitator may
transform the liens into ownership interests under s. 645.33(5).63

Ambac announced on March 24, 2010 that it had created a segregated
account for a large portion of its structured finance business and a small
part of its municipal business.64 The OCI petitioned for an order of
rehabilitation for Ambac’s Segregated Account.65 Then, Ambac announced
that it had contributed all of its business consisting of guarantees of RMBS
to the Segregated Account.66 It also contributed its exposure to a failing
infrastructure project (i.e., the Las Vegas Monorail), certain student loan
securitizations, and all CDS creditors that had not agreed to commute their
exposure.67 Ambac also allocated certain liabilities, such as Ambac
Assurance’s exposure on the lease of its New York headquarters.68
Additionally, Ambac contributed two assets to its Segregated Account.
The first was a $2 billion note secured by the premium flows attributable to
the business lines transferred to the Segregated Account.69 The second was
an excess of loss reinsurance agreement that obligated the remainder of
Ambac (the General Account) to pay the Segregated Account’s losses
above the $2 billion.70 Under neither instrument, however, would the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. § 611.24(3)(a).
Id. § 611.24(3)(e).
Rehab. Brief, supra note 57, at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Verified Petition for Order of Rehabilitation, Tab 1 at 2, In re The Rehab. of Segregated
Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter Rehab. Petition].
68. Id.
69. Id. Tab 1 at 3.
70. Id.
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General Account be required to make payments if its surplus declined
below $100 million.71
In addition to granting the OCI’s rehabilitation petition, Wisconsin’s
Dane County Circuit Court in Darlington, Wisconsin (the Rehabilitation
Court) issued an injunction.72 This injunction prohibited parties from taking
any action against the Segregated Account, the General Account in respect
of the Segregated Account, or the Commissioner.73 In addition, the
injunction barred any parties from exercising setoff and from exercising
rights under their documents that the Segregated Account would have had if
it were not in default.74
In early June 2010, Ambac concluded its commutation arrangement
with the CDS creditors that remained in the General Account. It agreed to
pay fourteen financial institutions that were counterparties on its CDS
transactions (the CDS Banks) $2.6 billion in cash and $2 billion in surplus
notes in exchange for a release from these liabilities.75 Ambac also granted
the commuting creditors certain releases, the terms of which were never
made public.76 The surplus notes have a stated maturity in 2020 and bear a
coupon rate of 5.1 percent. In an apparent indication of the valuation of the
surplus notes, some of the counterparties entered into call options with
Ambac under which Ambac could purchase $940 million of their surplus
notes for a weighted-average call price of $0.22 for each dollar of face
amount. Ambac and the CDS Banks hired BlackRock Solutions
(BlackRock) to evaluate the CDS exposure. BlackRock determined that the
present value of CDS exposure to the CDS Banks on a base case was $7.7
billion (or $9.2 billion on a stress case).77 The OCI calculated that the banks
received 43.3 percent of their expected losses—24.5 percent in cash and
18.8 percent in notes—and warned that the banks were entitled to $12.9
billion if they were able to terminate their swaps and demand a mark-tomarket payment. 78 The OCI’s calculation was incorrect as they paid the
CDS Banks $2.6 billion in cash with a present value of $2.6 billion for $7.7
billion of present value claims79 or approximately 34 percent of their claims
plus the notes. Meanwhile, Ambac, on its statutory books, carried only $4.3
71. Id. Tab 1 at 3–4.
72. See generally Order for Temporary Injunctive Relief, In re The Rehab. of Segregated
Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter Temporary Injunction].
73. Id. at 2. The injunction prohibiting actions against the Commissioner is unqualified in
every respect. The Commissioner may not be sued by anyone. Id. at 2–3.
74. Id. at 4–5. This was a truly remarkable result given that the claimants against the trusts that
issued the securities were not before the Rehabilitation Court.
75. Disclosure Statement, supra note 32, at 21–22.
76. Ambac 2009 10-K, supra note 55, at 6; Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
118–19 (Mar. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Ambac 2010 10-K].
77. Disclosure Statement, supra note 32, at 21.
78. Id. at 22.
79. Id. at 21.
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billion in impairment losses on subsidiary guarantees, not all of which was
for exposure to the CDS Banks.80 On this basis, the banks actually received
more than the carrying value of their claims.81
Multiple parties objected to the rehabilitation, and the Segregated
Account and the CDS Banks settlement. The Rehabilitation Court listened
to the objections and overruled each of them. The first came from the
indenture trustee of the Las Vegas Monorail bonds on April 5, 2010.82
Subsequent objections were made by holders of the Las Vegas Monorail
bonds and by a group of investors holding RMBS and other Ambacguaranteed exposures. The objections fall into a number of categories.
First, the RMBS holders objected to the formation of the Segregated
Account, claiming that it could not meet the standard articulated in
Wisconsin Statute section 611.24(3) of “adequate capital and surplus”
because it could not pay holders in cash and it was placed into rehabilitation
as soon as it was formed.83 They also argued that the formation was an
improper novation of their policies.84 They asserted that the formation of
the Segregated Account was a taking of private property for public use
without compensation under the Fifth Amendment and a denial of due
process for failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before
taking their rights through the rehabilitation petition.85 The Rehabilitation
Court heard these objections on May 25, 2010 and denied them on May 27,
2010.86 The RMBS holders’ appeal is currently pending before the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals.87
The RMBS investors, Freddie Mac (holder of substantial investments
backed by Ambac guaranties) and the Las Vegas Monorail holders, each
argued that the Wisconsin court was wrong to approve the CDS Bank
settlement without a full review. These objections were heard on May 25,
2010 and denied on May 27, 2010.88 The Rehabilitation Court adopted the
80. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 114 (May 17, 2010).
81. Given that $4.3 billion is less than $4.6 billion.
82. See Brief by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in its Capacity as Trustee for the Benefit and
Protection of Certain Bondholders, in Support of Its Motion to Modify Temporary Injunction
Order and to Intervene at Ex. A, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance
Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Apr. 5, 2010).
83. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Motion and Emergency Motion to Modify Order for
Temporary Injunctive Relief Filed by Certain RMBS Policyholders and Motion Seeking
Expedited Relief at 24–25, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp.,
No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Apr. 30, 2010).
84. Id. at 23–24.
85. Id. at 23–28.
86. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Motions of Certain RMBS
Policyholders and Certain LVM Bondholders at 1, 14–17, In re The Rehab. of Segregated
Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. May 27, 2010)
[hereinafter May 27th Order].
87. Notice of Appeal, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp.,
No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. May 28, 2010).
88. May 27th Order, supra note 86, at 14–17.
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OCI’s argument that the holders would not suffer irreparable harm if the
settlement were concluded.89 The OCI then argued to the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals that any challenge to the settlement should be dismissed as
moot.90 This resulted in a sharp rebuke from the appellate court and the
grant of permission for the holders to proceed with the appeal.91
Several policyholders, beneficiaries, creditors, and trustees objected to
their inclusion in the Segregated Account. These objections were also
denied.92
The OCI proposed a Rehabilitation Plan for the Segregated Account of
Ambac Assurance (the Plan) on October 8, 2010.93 The Plan proposed to
continue the injunction and begin a claim adjudication procedure that would
pay the claims against the Segregated Account 25 percent in cash and 75
percent in surplus notes to be issued by the Segregated Account and to be
pari passu with the surplus notes issued to the CDS Banks by the General
Account.94
Ambac’s fate took a turn when its parent, Ambac Financial, filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 on November 8, 2010.95 The holding
company could not obtain funding from the insurance subsidiaries. As a
result, it had $136 million in cash and investments at the end of 2009 to
support $1.6 billion in long-term debt.96 At the time of the filing, the

89.
90.
91.
92.

Order, Dilweg v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 2010AP1291 (Wis. App. June 18, 2010).
Id.
Id.
Order Denying Motions of Wells Fargo Bank and Certain LVM Bondholders and
Emergency Motions to Postpone the July 9, 2010 Hearing on the Motions of Wells Fargo Bank
and Certain LVM Bondholders at 8, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance
Corp., No. 10-CV-576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. July 16, 2010); see also May 27th Order, supra
note 86, at 14–17; Decision on Motions Challenging the Legality of the Establishment and
Structure of The Segregated Account, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac
Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 26, 2010); Challenges to the
Temporary Injunction Concerning the Exercise of Control Rights, Withholding of Premiums and
Other Objections, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 26, 2010); Motions to Formally Intervene as Parties to
this Rehabilitation Action, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp.,
No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 26, 2010).
93. See Plan of Rehabilitation, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance
Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 8, 2010).
94. Disclosure Statement, supra note 32, at 21. Hearings on the Plan were held by the
Rehabilitation Court in Darlington, over objections to the forum and requests for better facilities in
a metropolitan area. The judge went so far as to tell counsel for some of the student loan lenders to
check into the Super 8 in Darlington when he could not find a room and later humorously offered
to help him find a place to stay. Transcript of Hearing at 39–40, 88, In re The Rehab. of
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct.
14, 2010).
95. Voluntary Petition, In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-15973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,
2010).
96. Ambac 2009 10-K, supra note 55, at 214.
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bankruptcy schedules showed only $63 million in cash and another $22
million in securities.97
In late 2009, nearly a year before Ambac Financial filed for bankruptcy,
Ambac took a tax refund, which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is
seeking to recapture. After Ambac Financial went into bankruptcy, the IRS
could have sought recovery from Ambac’s General Account because all
members of a consolidated tax group are jointly and severally liable for
taxes.98 Anticipating IRS collection, the OCI went to the Rehabilitation
Court on the eve of Ambac Financial’s bankruptcy petition to gain an
injunction against the IRS to prevent it from collecting taxes from the
General Account or the Segregated Account.99 The OCI also amended the
Plan for the Segregated Account to allocate the IRS’s claim to the
Segregated Account.100
The IRS attempted to remove the proceedings to the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin where it sought to have the
injunction dissolved.101 The IRS made the somewhat revolutionary claim
that laws for the collection of tax, unlike many federal statutes, such as the
Bankruptcy Code, need not be reverse preempted by the Wisconsin
insurance receivership statutes.102 Although McCarran-Ferguson shields
some parts of state receivership laws from preemption by federal statutes,103
the IRS argued that McCarran-Ferguson was passed pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, and thus, did not preempt tax statutes passed pursuant to
the Taxation Clause.104 The federal court, however, sided with the
Commissioner and remanded the case to the state court based upon its
interpretation of McCarran-Ferguson.105

97. Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (Schedule B), In re
Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-15973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010).
98. Complaint at 14, Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. v. United States (In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc.),
Adv. Pro. No. 10-04210 (Nov. 9, 2010).
99. Order for Temporary Supplemental Injunctive Relief at 1–2, In re The Rehab. of
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Nov.
8, 2010).
100. Notice of Amendment to Plan of Operation for the Segregated Account, In re The Rehab.
of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty.
Nov. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Notice of Amendment to Plan].
101. See generally Notice of Removal to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No.
10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Dec. 8, 2010); Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dissolve Order for Temporary Supplemental Injunctive Relief and Objections to Notice, Motion
and Order at 2, Dilweg v. United States, No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 17, 2010).
102. See United States’ Opposition to Motion to Remand at 7–8, Dilweg, No. 10-CV-778 (W.D.
Wis. Dec. 30, 2010) [hereinafter IRS Remand Brief].
103. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500 (1993).
104. IRS Remand Brief, supra note 102, at 7.
105. Order and Opinion at 2, Nickel v. United States (In re The Rehab. of the Segregated
Account of Ambac Assurance Corp.), No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Jan.
14 Order].

150

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

After the Seventh Circuit signaled it would reject its appeal of the
remand order,106 the IRS tried again—this time as a direct suit against the
court to stay the injunction.107 The district court turned the IRS away
again.108 As of this writing, briefing on the appeals in the Seventh Circuit is
largely completed, but no decision has been reached. Meanwhile, on
remand, the Wisconsin court promptly confirmed the Plan.109 The IRS
appealed the confirmation.110 The OCI, however, persuaded the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals that the IRS’s appeal should be dismissed because the
attorney signing it was not admitted in Wisconsin.111 The IRS has appealed
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and briefing is underway in the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals on the various other objections to confirmation of the
Plan.112
IV. CHANGES TO INSURANCE INSOLVENCY PRINCIPLES
The proceedings in relation to Ambac’s distress are interesting to the
insurance insolvency professional because they test four key insolvency
principles: (1) the priority of claims in an insurance company insolvency,
(2) the role of the best interests of creditors test in insurance rehabilitations,
(3) the ability of an insurance company to divide its liabilities, and (4) the
robustness of McCarran-Ferguson’s reverse preemption of federal statutes.
This paper will address each of these four issues in turn.
A. PRIORITY
Insurance receiverships have existed longer than the Bankruptcy Code
or its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The priority of claims in an
insurance receivership is governed by state priority statutes.113 As the
Supreme Court recounted in U.S. Department of the Treasury v. Fabe, the
106. Order, Nickel v. United States, No. 11-1158 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 2011) (making a preliminary
finding that the district court’s order to remand the matter to the state court is not reviewable).
107. Memorandum of Law in Support of United States’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
for Expedited Ruling by February 17, 2011, United States v. Wis. State Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty.,
767 F. Supp. 2d 980 (W.D. Wis. 2011) (No. 11-CV-99).
108. United States v. Wis. State Ct. for Dane Cnty., 767 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (W.D. Wis.
2011).
109. Decision and Final Order Confirming the Rehabilitator’s Plan of Rehabilitation with
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac
Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Jan. 24, 2011).
110. Notice of Appeal at 1, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance
Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 8, 2011).
111. Order at 10, Dilweg v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nos. 2010AP1291, 2010AP2022, 2010AP2835,
2010AP300, 2010AP561 (Wis. Ct. App. May 3, 2011).
112. See generally Reply Brief for United States of America Interested Party-AppellantPetitioner, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., App. No.
2011AP987 (Wis. Nov. 3, 2011); Appellants’ Consolidated Reply Brief, App. No. 2011 AP 561
(Wis. App. Aug. 29, 2011).
113. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7434–7435 (McKinney 2005) (governing property casualty
companies and life insurance companies).
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costs of administering the estate come first, and policyholders generally
come second. Thanks to Fabe’s conclusion that the Federal Priority Statute,
31 U.S.C. § 3713(a), was preempted by state statute, the federal
government comes after policyholders, and all other creditors follow.114
Those holding claims under reinsurance policies are treated as general
creditors, not policyholders, whether the statutes say so,115 or not.116
The question most often asked when contemplating the insolvency of a
financial guaranty company is: what is the relative priority of CDS
counterparties and those holding guaranties of municipal bonds? Although
discussed in some of the Ambac pleadings,117 this issue has never been fully
litigated. It can be argued that those policyholders holding direct guarantees
of municipal bonds have priority over CDS counterparties because: (1) the
“policies” issued to guaranty CDS payments are simply subsidiary
guarantees (i.e., the insurance company is merely guaranteeing the
performance of its non-insurance subsidiary that entered into the swap);118
(2) CDSs are not part of the business of insurance119 and therefore are not
entitled to protection from the Federal Priority Statute that places the
federal government first in any non-bankruptcy insolvency;120 (3) holders of
CDSs lack an insurable interest because most do not hold the underlying
obligations against which they have purchased CDS protection, and
therefore, CDSs are not insurance policies at all;121 and (4) CDSs are akin to
114. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 508–09 (1993).
115. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 7434; CAL. INS. CODE. § 1033(d)(3) (West 2000).
116. See, e.g., 40 P.A. STAT. ANN. § 221.44 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3903.42
(West 2005); see also Covington v. Ohio Gen. Ins. Co., 99 Ohio St. 3d 117, 2003-Ohio-2720, 789
N.E.2d 213, at ¶ 3 (discussing reinsurance creditors).
117. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Emergency Motion to Enjoin Consummation of the Proposed
Settlement between Ambac and Certain CDS Counterparties at 14–17, In re The Rehab. of
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. May
5, 2011). The circuit court’s decision in the matter was based almost entirely on deference to the
regulator. See May 27th Order, supra note 86, at 14–17.
118. If we consider an ordinary corporation that guarantees the performance of a subsidiary—
for example, to obtain credit to purchase goods—an observer would not likely say that such an
exchange is insurance, would they?
119. The CDS industry agrees that CDSs are not insurance:
CDSs are not insurance for numerous reasons. Most significantly, there is no
requirement that the protection buyer own the asset on which it is buying protection or
that it suffer any loss. Other common features of CDSs that distinguish them from
insurance include: (i) the absence of a requirement that the buyer provide proof of loss
as a condition to payment; (ii) payment upon settlement that may be more than the loss
(if any) suffered by the buyer; (iii) the absence of rights of subrogation; and (iv)
differences in accounting, tax, bankruptcy and other regulatory treatment.
Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 7 n.2, Aon Fin. Prod. v.
Société Générale, No. 06-1080-CV (2d Cir. May 8, 2006) (citation omitted).
120. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 492 (1993).
121. See Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Chase, 72 U.S. 509, 512–13 (1866) (“The assured must
therefore have an interest in the property insured; otherwise, there is a temptation to destroy it,
which sound policy condemns.”).
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reinsurance because they simply assume a risk voluntarily assumed by
another entity.122
It can also be argued that mark-to-market damages upon swap
termination are “penalties or forfeitures” which, under Wisconsin’s priority
statute, are allowed as general creditors “only to the extent of the pecuniary
loss sustained from the act, transaction or proceeding out of which the
penalty or forfeiture arose,” with the rest being subordinated to the most
junior class.123 Proponents of equal priority for CDS counterparty claimants
frequently say that the CDS policyholders have an interest in the financial
performance of the subsidiary, and therefore, have an insurable interest.124
Proponents of CDS interests may also argue that under the Wisconsin
priority statute, surety bonds have policyholder priority, and that these
policies are a form of municipal bond guaranty which constitute surety
insurance under Wisconsin regulations.125 CDS counterparties also argue
that their losses are not “penalties” or “forfeitures” because those terms
refer to punishments by government authorities.126
In Ambac, one can easily argue that the CDS counterparties, who got
out with cash long before anyone else did and received a third of their
probable claims in cash, actually enjoyed priority over the RMBS creditors
who will receive 25 percent in cash and the rest in the surplus notes, the
payment of which is quite uncertain (remembering the call options granted
by the banks at approximately 22 percent of face value).127 The CDS Banks
could also enjoy priority over the municipal holders who are at the mercy of
Ambac paying out all but $100 million of the General Account’s surplus to
cover RMBS losses, leaving the General Account exposed to a major
municipal failure.128 The CDS counterparties arguably did as well or better
than the other two groups, and they certainly were paid sooner.
B. THE BEST INTERESTS OF CREDITORS TEST
It has long been a part of the confirmation of a bankruptcy plan of
reorganization under Chapter 11 that a dissenting creditor must receive as
much as he would in a liquidation.129 This is commonly called the “best
interests of creditors test.” It has been handed down in insurance insolvency
122. Actually, the risk is transferred twice. First, someone buys a bond, and they assume the
risk of default. They then place that risk with the subsidiary of a financial guaranty company, and
then the financial guaranty company guarantees the risk of its subsidiary’s nonpayment. See supra
text accompanying note 38.
123. WIS. STAT. § 645.68 (5) (2009–2010).
124. See Bank of Insureds’ Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 9–11.
125. WIS. STAT. § 645.03(2); WIS. ADM. CODE INS. § 3.08(1).
126. Bank of Insureds’ Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 11–12.
127. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Report of Unscheduled Events or Corporate Changes (Form 8-K) 2
(Oct. 12, 2010).
128. Rehab. Petition, supra note 67, Tab 1 at 3–4.
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2006).
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from two celebrated insurance rehabilitations: the Pacific Mutual Insurance
Company insolvency in the 1940s in California and the National Surety
Company insolvency in the 1930s in New York.130
In these two cases, a distressed insurer was divided up into separate
units in order to save the successful business and liquidate the business that
caused the impairment.131 In National Surety, the rehabilitation plan
contemplated three companies: one for “selected lines of preferred risks,” a
second for “obligations under mortgage guaranties,” and a third to liquidate
the remaining assets.132 In Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company of California, life policyholders would be transferred to a new
company and paid as before, but non-cancellable disability policyholders
would receive from 20–90 percent of their claims depending on the year of
issue.133 The non-consenting holders would be left in the old company
which would be liquidated.134 In each case, the lines of business that
brought about the insolvency were treated less favorably than those that did
not.
Both courts emphasized the need for a creative rehabilitation. The
National Surety court stated that “numerous other creditors and those
dealing with the National Surety Company will most likely be saved
millions of dollars by the method of rehabilitation proposed by the
superintendent of insurance.”135 The Carpenter court stated that “[t]he
public has a grave and important interest in preserving the business if that is
possible.”136 The court continued, “Liquidation is the last resort.”137
In order to reach these goals, the California Supreme Court found that
disparate treatment was appropriate:
Moreover, the record demonstrates that under the circumstances here
existing the difference in treatment was justified. The life policyholders,
and the commercial health and accident policyholders were paying
adequate premiums for their insurance and these phases of the old
company’s business were highly profitable. The [non-cancellable]
policyholders were not paying adequate premiums, and this fact was the
primary cause of the difficulties of the old company. The [noncancellable] policies were draining the old company to disaster. If any
plan of rehabilitation was to succeed it was imperative that the integrity of
the life business be preserved in order to earn profits for the benefit of all
130. Carpenter v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 74 P.2d 761, 778 (Cal. 1938), aff’d sub nom.,
Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938); Matter of People of the State of N.Y., by Van Schaick
(In re Nat’l Sur. Co.), 268 N.Y.S. 88, 91 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t. 1933), aff’d, 191 N.E. 521 (N.Y.
1934).
131. Carpenter, 74 P.2d at 771–72; In re Nat’l Sur. Co., 268 N.Y.S. at 91.
132. In re Nat’l Sur. Co., 268 N.Y.S. at 91.
133. Carpenter, 74 P.2d at 768.
134. Id.
135. In re Nat’l Sur. Co., 268 N.Y.S. at 96.
136. Carpenter, 74 P.2d at 775.
137. Id.

154

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

concerned, including the [non-cancellable] policyholders. Continued
profits from the life business, and from the profitable accident and health
business, furnished the only sources from which full contract benefits to
[non-cancellable] policyholders could ever be resumed.138

The court concluded, however, that the dissenting holders would not be
inappropriately disadvantaged as long as they received at least what they
would have received in liquidation: “All the dissenter is entitled to is the
equivalent of what he would receive on liquidation.”139
The Supreme Court, in affirming Carpenter, factored in the right to
receive breach damages, and found that constitutional rights had not been
abridged:
The petitioners have no constitutional right to a particular form of remedy.
They are not entitled, as against their fellows who prefer to come under
the plan and accept its benefits, to force, at their own wish or whim, a
liquidation which under the findings will not advantage them and may
seriously injure those who accept the benefit of the plan. They are not
bound, as were the dissenting creditors in Doty v. Love . . . , to accept the
obligation of the new company but are afforded an alternative whereby
they will receive damages for breach of their contracts. They have failed
140
to show that the plan takes their property without due process.

It is important to note that in Doty, the bank under consideration had
been in liquidation proceedings for two years. Justice Cardozo, in writing
for the court, makes it clear that the creditors were better off in
rehabilitation, than they would have been had the bank been liquidated.141
In the case of Ambac, the Commissioner expressly rejected the best
interests of creditors test, concluding that “nothing in Carpenter suggests
that it is a necessary component of all rehabilitation plans; indeed, by
providing an alternative justification for the plan’s differing treatment of a
certain subset of policyholders, it suggests the opposite.”142
In Ambac, the application of the best interests of creditors test is
complex. The CDS holders were paid out right away. If they are found to be
junior to other creditors, then the RMBS holders received a poor deal. If the
CDS holders are found to be equal to the other creditors, then the RMBS
and municipal holders could argue that the CDS holders received much
better treatment since they received money right away, while the other two
groups had to take the risks of a long payout and possibly huge claims. If
138. Id. at 778.
139. Id.
140. See Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297, 305 (1938) (footnote omitted) (citing Doty v.
Love, 295 U.S. 64 (1935)).
141. See Doty, 295 U.S. at 70–74.
142. Rehabilitator’s Brief in Support of Motion for Confirmation of the Plan of Rehabilitation
at 14 n.3, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576
(Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 21, 2010) (citing Carpenter, 74 P.2d at 778–79).
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claims on both of these groups turn out to be modest and all claimants are
paid in full, then no complaint could be had, but it will be a long ride until
we know the truth. If, on the other hand, creditors are not paid in full, it is
entirely possible that the RMBS holders will receive less than the CDS
counterparties did and will receive it much further into the future. If the
surplus notes turn out to be worthless, the RMBS holders will have received
25 percent of their claims when they come due, while the CDS
counterparties received a third or more of their claims at the start of the
case.
Unlike the parties in Carpenter, none of the creditors here were offered
a liquidation value alternative.143 Unlike Doty, Ambac has not yet been
involved in a liquidation proceeding.144 While, like National Surety, Ambac
placed assets in defined pools, granting creditors recourse to those defined
pools, Ambac lacks the judicial findings that are emphasized by Justice
Cardozo in Doty.145 Cardozo emphasized, “The judicial power has not been
delegated to nonjudicial agencies or to persons or factions interested in the
event.”146 The safeguard of the best interests of creditors test is absent from
the Ambac proceedings.
C. TRANSFERRING LIABILITIES
Transferring the policy liabilities of an insurance company to another
entity is not a widely accepted practice in the United States, but it is in the
United Kingdom under Part VII of the U.K. Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000 (Part VII).147
Part VII provides “for the transfer to the transferee of the whole or any
part of the undertaking concerned and of any property or liabilities of the
authorised person concerned.”148 Insurance business transfers are permitted
under section 105.149 In connection with a Part VII transfer, the liabilities of
the transferor are transferred to a transferee, and the transferor is released
from any further liability.150 Thus, if the transferee subsequently fails, the
creditors have no recourse to their original contractual obligor.151
Part VII provides for judicial review and approval of the proposed
transfer after an administrative review by the U.K. market regulator, the
Financial Services Authority (FSA).152 The FSA engages an actuarial
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See Neblett, 305 U.S. at 305.
See Doty, 295 U.S. at 65.
Id. at 71; see generally May 27th Order, supra note 86.
Doty, 295 U.S. at 71.
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 107 (U.K.).
Id. § 112(1)(a).
Id. § 105.
Id. § 112.
Id.
See id. § 109(3). The FSA is in the process of being abolished and replaced with prudential
and consumer protection regulators, but this change has not yet taken effect. Radical Plans to
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expert, paid by the transferor, who reviews the proposed transaction to
determine whether the transferee will have the financial ability to pay the
liabilities transferred.153 If the report is positive and the FSA is otherwise
satisfied with the proposed transfer, the transferor commences legal
proceedings for sanctioning under Part VII.154 Creditors whose claims are
being transferred are entitled to receive notice of the proceeding. Unlike
their distant cousin, schemes of arrangement, creditors are not entitled to
vote, and their basis for objection is extremely limited. In addition, it
appears that in practice, creditors have little or no right to receive
information concerning the details behind an expert’s analysis.155
A Part VII transfer differs meaningfully from U.S. law, in that U.S. law
does not permit a corporation to channel liabilities to particular assets in the
absence of insolvency proceedings.156 While a corporation could
theoretically accomplish a similar result by rearranging its assets through
dividends, an insurance company is unlikely to be able to do so as a
practical matter, due to dividend restrictions and capital requirements.
Moreover, in a Part VII transfer, there may be no continuity between the
transferor and the transferee as to management or financial strength.157
While this result may be theoretically possible in a merger, the degree of
separation effectuated by a Part VII transfer would be difficult to
replicate.158
Opponents of a Part VII transfer will argue that the transfer effectuates
a novation of a contract without the consent of the creditor. Novations
without the consent of the parties are barred in most of the United States.
Under the common law of contracts, an obligor may generally delegate
performance of his contractual duty to another. However, neither the fact
that the obligor delegates performance of a contract, nor that fact that a
person contracts with the obligor to assume the duty, will discharge any
duty or liability of the original obligor, unless the obligee agrees
otherwise.159

Replace the FSA Have Fallen Behind Schedule, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.guard
ian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/02/fsa-replacement-watchdogs-delayed/print.
153. Financial Services and Markets Act § 109.
154. Id. § 111–12.
155. See In re Norwich Union Linked Life Assurance Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Ch) 2802 [20]
(Eng.).
156. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 340 B.R. 49, 62–65 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988); In re
Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 179–82 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
157. See, e.g., In re Norwich Union Linked Life Assurance Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Ch) 2802 [14–
15] (Eng.).
158. See, e.g., Sompo Japan Ins. Inc. v. Transfercom Ltd., [2007] EWHC (Ch) 146, [27] (Eng.)
(confirming the Part VII scheme).
159. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 804 F. Supp. 217, 225 (D. Kan. 1992) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318(1)–(3) (1979)); see also id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 280 cmt. d (1979) (“For a novation to take place, the

2011]

The New World Order

157

As described below, novations without consent are contrary to the wellsettled law in many states, including the three largest, California, New
York, and Texas.160
California law does not permit a novation without the consent of the
creditor.
What appellant is really contending for is a novation. The Civil Code,
section 1530, defines this as the ‘substitution of a new obligation for an
existing one.’ An essential element of a novation is the agreement of all of
the parties to the new contract.161

In California, this restriction on novation is codified by statute. The
California Code states in pertinent part, “[t]he burden of an obligation may
be transferred with the consent of the party entitled to its benefit, but not
otherwise, except as provided by section 1466,” which governs real estate
covenants.162 Although there is a special provision for an insurer
withdrawing entirely from California to transfer policies to another insurer,
this section “is silent regarding the extent of any continuing liability on the
part of the withdrawing insurer.”163 A California appellate court ruled, “It
simply is not within the power of an insurer, against the consent of the
insured, to substitute another insurer in carrying out of its undertaking.”164
New York has a long tradition holding a party to its contractual duty
unless the creditor consents to a novation transaction.
If the defendant chose to perform its contract through an independent
contractor, it may have been within its rights. Nevertheless it could not
thereby escape liability for its nonperformance through the negligence of
one to whom the contract duty was assigned.165

Similarly, in Texas, novation is strictly consensual. As a Texas
appellate court explained,

obligee must assent to the discharge of the obligor’s duty in consideration for the promise of the
third party to undertake that duty.”); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“Thus, once a party has made a promise, it is responsible to the obligee to ensure that
performance will be satisfactory, even if the promising party obtains some third party to carry out
its promise.”).
160. See infra text accompanying notes 161–66.
161. Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 718, 723 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962) (quoting 36 CAL. JUR. 2d 427, Novation § 3.).
162. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1457, 1466 (West 2011).
163. Baer v. Associated Life Ins. Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 236, 239 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1988); see
also CAL. INS. CODE § 1071.5 (West 2000).
164. Baer, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 239 (citing Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 70 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934)).
165. Davidson v. Madison Corp., 177 N.E. 393, 394 (N.Y. 1931); see also N.Y. Dep’t of Ins.,
Gen. Counsel, Op. No. 08-07-15 (2008) (“New York common law requires an insured’s consent
to effectuate a transfer of his insurance contract to another insurer that is assuming all the rights,
responsibilities and functions of the original underwriting insurer.”).
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To constitute novation of an original contract, an agreement made
thereunder must have fully extinguished the same . . . .
The essential elements of a novation are: (1) a previous, valid
obligation, (2) an agreement of the parties to a new contract, (3) the
extinguishment of the old contract and, (4) the validity of the new
contract.166

This is also the law in other states.167
Proponents of a Part VII transfer could potentially argue in response
that assumption reinsurance transactions effectuate novations without
creditor consent.168 An assumption reinsurance transaction transfers policies
and their liabilities to a new insurance company.169 Only seventeen states,
however, have statutes that authorize these transactions. Most of those
statutes, as well as the NAIC Assumption Reinsurance Model Act, provide
that assumption cannot occur unless the policyholder consents or the insurer
is in a hazardous financial condition.170
Ambac did not pursue an assumption reinsurance transaction. Ambac
used the segregated account machinery to put liabilities into another
separate structure, the Segregated Account.171 Although there are no readily

166. Siegler v. Telco Leasing, Inc., 593 S.W.2d 850, 851–52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
167. See, e.g., Pagounis v. Pendleton, 753 N.E.2d 808, 811 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (“Without the
agreement of the parties to an extinguishment of the prior contract and to a substitution of the new
contract, there can be no novation.”).
168. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-10-45 (2010) (providing that the regulator may approve a
transfer by assumption reinsurance if the insurer is in hazardous condition notwithstanding any
requirement of policyholder consent and describing that the regulator may find that there is
“implied” consent to the transfer).
169. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-52-2 (West 2011) (defining an “assumption reinsurance
agreement” as a contract which, “(A) Transfers insurance obligations or risks of existing or inforce contracts of insurance from a transferring insurer to an assuming insurer; and (B) Is intended
to effect a novation of the transferred contract of insurance with the result that the assuming
insurer becomes directly liable to the policyholders of the transferring insurer and the transferring
insurer’s insurance obligations or risks under such contracts are extinguished”).
170. Ten states have adopted the Model Act. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-52-4 (West 2011);
COLO. CODE REGS. § 3-3-1 (1994); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 375.1290, 375.1294; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 58-10-35, 58-10-45. Another seven have adopted their own versions, including Arizona,
Pennsylvania, Washington, Arkansas, and West Virginia. Arizona prohibits assumption of policies
“unless the affected contract holder or policyholder consents to or fails to reject the transfer or
assignment . . . or unless the director approves the transfer or assignment pursuant to this section.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-736 (2011) (West). The Pennsylvania regulation makes no mention of
property-casualty insurance and provides no procedure to obtain approval for a transaction. 31 PA.
CODE §§ 90i.1–90i.3 (2011). The Washington regulation requires the affirmative consent of each
policyholder. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-95-030(2) (2011). Arkansas provides for policyholder
notice, but not consent. 54 ARK. CODE R. § 55 (LexisNexis 2011). West Virginia provides for
advance filing and approval, which can be waived by the Commissioner for companies in
hazardous financial conditions. W. VA. CODE § 33-4-15(e) (2010). Alaska and Iowa have adopted
statutes limiting assumption reinsurance with non-admitted insurers to those with regulatory
approval, but have not adopted other provisions. AK. STAT. § 21.12.025 (2005); IOWA CODE.
§ 515-68A (2009).
171. See generally Rehab. Petition, supra note 67.
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identifiable transactions that affect a transfer of an active book of business
into an envelope that is unlikely to have the resources to pay those
liabilities, the use of a separation in Ambac looks very much like a Part VII
transfer.172 The primary difference is that the Segregated Account has
access to most of the capital of the General Account through the Secured
Note and the Excess of Loss Reinsurance Agreement.173 After the General
Account falls to $100 million in surplus, the Segregated Account creditors
may no longer look to the General Account for payment.174
D. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON DILEMMA
McCarran-Ferguson175 has faced its greatest test to date in the dispute
between the IRS and the Ambac Rehabilitator. This dispute centers on
Ambac Financial’s change in its accounting method for CDSs. Prior to
2005, Ambac Financial filed consolidated returns on behalf of itself and the
members of its corporate group including Ambac Assurance, recognizing
any gain or loss at the time a credit derivative position was closed out.176 In
early 2008, Ambac changed its accounting method to one that recognizes
gain or loss on a mark-to-market basis.177 Ambac claimed that this
accounting change was related to its change in the form it used for credit
derivative transactions from a physical settlement form to a cash settlement
form in 2005. In 2005 and 2006, however, Ambac filed its returns without
recognizing any gain or loss on the post-2005 contracts unless the trades
had been closed out.178
When Ambac adopted a mark-to-market approach, it recognized a small
loss in 2008 for the year ending December 31, 2007 and a huge loss in 2009
for 2008, resulting in over $700 million of tax refunds.179 According to the
IRS, it had no choice but to give Ambac the refund and analyze it later.180
Ambac placed its Segregated Account into rehabilitation proceedings on

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra text accompanying notes 148–55.
See Rehab. Petition, supra note 67, Tab 1 at 3–4.
See id. Tab 1 at 3.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006).
See Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment Determining Amount of
Tax Liability at 6–7, Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. v. United States (In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc.), Adv.
No. 10-04210 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Ambac IRS Bankruptcy Complaint].
177. Id. at 9–10.
178. Id. at 8–9.
179. Id. at 11; see also Affidavit of David W. Wallis in Support of Debtor’s Chapter 11 Petition
and First Day Motions and Pursuant to Local Rule 1007-2 at 8, In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No.
10-15973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010).
180. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dissolve Order for Temporary Supplemental
Injunctive Relief and Objections to Notice, Motion and Order at 6 n.19, Dilweg v. United States,
No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter IRS Inj. Brief] (citing Coca-Cola v.
United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 253, 256–57 (Fed. 2009), to support the proposition that pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 6213(b)(3) (2006) & Treas. Reg. § 301.6213-1(b)(2), the IRS has the authority to grant a
“tentative refund”).
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March 24, 2010, less than two months after receiving its last refund of
approximately $444 million.181
When the IRS came calling on October 28, 2010, they asked if Ambac
had received permission from the IRS to change its accounting methods.182
Ambac Financial responded on November 8, 2010 by filing for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.183 The IRS responded
that members of a group filing a consolidated return are jointly and
severally liable for tax liabilities, pursuant to 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1502-6,
1.1502-78.184 This exposed the General Account to the liability to repay the
disputed refund.
The day before Ambac Financial’s bankruptcy petition was filed,
however, the Wisconsin Commissioner in his role as Rehabilitator of
Ambac’s Segregated Account, amended the Segregated Account’s
Operating Plan to channel the IRS’s claims to the Segregated Account,
which was in rehabilitation and subject to a judicial stay.185 The
Commissioner also persuaded the Rehabilitation Court, ex parte, to enter an
injunction barring the IRS from collecting against either the General
Account or Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance.186 This remarkable
series of events left the refund dispute subject to the rehabilitation
injunction and the IRS with no way to reclaim the refund, even if the IRS is
successful in demonstrating that Ambac Financial was not entitled to the
refund.187
The IRS responded by filing a notice of removal to send its portion of
the rehabilitation case to the Federal District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin.188 Once in federal court the Commissioner petitioned the
court to remand the proceeding to state court, and the IRS filed a motion to
dissolve the state court injunction.189
In his motion to remand the proceeding to state court, the
Commissioner argued that the federal court had no jurisdiction to hear the

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Ambac IRS Bankruptcy Complaint, supra note 176, at 11.
Id. at 12.
IRS Inj. Brief, supra note 180, at 6–7.
Id.
Notice of Amendment to Plan, supra note 100.
Motion for Temporary Supplemental Injunctive Relief and Order for Temporary
Supplemental Injunctive Relief at 9–11, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac
Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Nov. 8, 2010) [hereinafter
Temporary Supplemental Injunction].
187. Without the ability to challenge the injunction, the IRS cannot collect from the General
Account. The IRS cannot collect from the Segregated Account while it is in receivership. See
United States Reply in Support of its Motion to Dissolve Injunction at 9, Dilweg v. United States,
No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Jan 1, 2011). The IRS cannot collect from the bankrupt holding
company while it is in proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
188. Notice of Removal to the United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin, Dilweg, No 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 8, 2010).
189. See generally IRS Inj. Brief, supra note 180.
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dispute.190 He maintained that the removal to federal court was precluded
by McCarran-Ferguson.191
(a) State regulation – The business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation – No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or
tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business
of insurance[.]192

The Commissioner insisted that chapter 645 of the Wisconsin statutes
gives the Rehabilitation Court exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings and
that it can enforce remedies that protect those proceedings.193 He further
argued that a grant of jurisdiction to the federal court would “impair and
supersede” the proceeding under chapter 645,194 which regulates the
business of insurance.195 Furthermore, the segregated account statute
allowed him to assign the IRS’s claims to the Segregated Account.196 The
Commissioner claimed that the federal jurisdiction statues do not
specifically relate to the business of insurance,197 and that the IRS’s rights
could be preserved in state court.198
In addition, the Commissioner encouraged the federal court to abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction because any federal action would interfere
with a state regulatory scheme.199 The Commissioner correctly referred to
many cases in which federal courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction
over the matter.200
The IRS responded with the following arguments. First, McCarranFerguson does not apply to the federal government’s powers to tax. It
maintained that the U.S. Constitution’s Taxation Clause, prevents the states
from restraining that power.201 Second, the IRS argued that the AntiInjunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), prevents state courts from issuing

190. Brief in Support of Motion to Remand by the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance, as
Court-Appointed Rehabilitator of the Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corporation at
26–27, Dilweg, No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter OCI Remand Brief].
191. Id. at 29–33.
192. Id. at 26–27 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006)).
193. Id. at 26–29.
194. Id. at 30–31.
195. Id. at 29–30.
196. Id. at 28 n.12.
197. Id. at 29.
198. Id. at 35.
199. See id. at 36–41.
200. Id. at 37.
201. IRS Remand Brief, supra note 102, at 2–3 (citing U.S. Const. art.1, § 8 cl. 1).
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injunctions that interfere with federal taxation.202 Third, Ambac took
advantage of the ability to file a consolidated return and must therefore
abide by the rules regarding returns.203 Fourth, the IRS’s ability to recapture
tentative refunds is an important part of the taxing power.204 The IRS
insisted that McCarran-Ferguson could not abridge the taxing power
because the Act was enacted under Congress’ Commerce Clause powers,
not its taxing powers, 205 an argument developed in a law journal article.206
Fifth, as a question of federal power, the IRS claimed it had the right to
remove the action to federal court.207 They argued that nothing should
restrict a federal government agency from having a question of its powers
reviewed by a federal court.208 Sixth, the IRS maintained that the state court
does not have jurisdiction over parts of Ambac other than the Segregated
Account,209 and therefore, could not have jurisdiction over the IRS’s tax
claims against the General Account. Seventh, the IRS argued against a
Burford abstention,210 claiming that federal courts should decide questions
of the government’s constitutional prerogatives.211 Eighth, they disputed the
Rehabilitation Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, maintaining that rehabilitation
can continue in federal court, pursuant to Wisconsin Statute section 645.45
and Wisconsin Statute section 645.82(4).212 The IRS encouraged the federal
court to look beyond the company’s status as an insurance company and
acknowledge that the fundamental nature of the action related to the power
to tax, as the IRS believed.213
The Commissioner replied that the IRS had “misunderst[ood]
Wisconsin law and the relationship between the [General and] Segregated
Accounts.”214 The Commissioner claimed that the IRS just wanted to seize
$700 million “in violation” of McCarran-Ferguson;215 and that there was a
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Raymond A. Guenter, Rediscovering the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Commerce Clause
Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 316–17 (2000).
207. IRS Remand Brief, supra note 102, at 9–10.
208. Id. at 12–15.
209. Id. at 15–17.
210. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 726–27 (1996) (citing Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)). Burford allows a federal court to dismiss a
case only if it presents “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial
public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar,” or if its adjudication
in a federal forum “would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect
to a matter of substantial public concern.” Id.
211. IRS Remand Brief, supra note 102, at 20–23.
212. Id. at 23 n.15.
213. Id. at 10–12.
214. Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Remand by the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance
at 1, Dilweg v. United States, No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 1, 2011) [hereinafter OCI Remand
Reply].
215. Id. at 6.
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“legal nexus” between the General and Segregated Account because they
were one entity prior to the rehabilitation petition, and because the General
Account provides the funding for the Segregated Account.216 The
Commissioner maintained that no constitutional issue was present; and that
the dispute was a conflict between a federal law passed by Congress and a
Wisconsin state law.217 The Commissioner reasoned that since the language
of McCarran-Ferguson begins with, “No Act of Congress shall be
construed,” and tax legislation is enacted by Congress, the tax collection
legislation must yield to state law. 218
The IRS also petitioned the federal court to dissolve the state court
injunction that prevented it from collecting from the General Account.219
The IRS claimed that the General Account exists outside the insurance
regulatory framework and McCarran-Ferguson. First, it claimed that the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) specifically relates to the business of
insurance because the IRC imposes tax on insurance companies.220 It
posited that when Congress legislates in the area of insurance, the
McCarran-Ferguson preemption is eviscerated.221 The IRS also argued that
the revised injunction was a violation of the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421.222 The IRS contended that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits any
court from taking subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order restraining the
IRS from collecting taxes. It claimed that the IRC establishes “exclusive
federal jurisdiction.”223 The IRS also questioned the use of the Wisconsin
segregated account statute to justify the allocation of tax liability as a part
of the insurance company’s “business.”224
The Commissioner’s response to the IRS’s motion stayed close to his
McCarran-Ferguson arguments, saying that “this is not a tax case; it is an
insurance case.”225 The Commissioner claimed that the IRS was trying to
subvert the Fabe holding, which prioritizes policyholder’s claims over the
federal government’s claims.226 He argued that the Wisconsin priority
statute227 regulates the business of insurance along with the rest of chapter

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See id. at 3, 5.
Id. at 25–29.
Id.
IRS Inj. Brief, supra note 180, at 1–2.
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 801, 831, 6201 (2006); Hanover Ins. Co. v. C.I.R., 598 F.2d 1211,
1218 (1st Cir. 1979); IRS Inj. Brief, supra note 180, at 12, 17.
221. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2000).
222. IRS Inj. Brief, supra note 180, at 8.
223. Id. at 11.
224. Id. at 19.
225. Brief of Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance in Opposition to United States Internal
Revenue Service’s Motion to Dissolve Order for Temporary Injunctive Relief at 1, Dilweg v.
United States, No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 30. 2010) [hereinafter OCI Inj. Brief].
226. Id. at 2.
227. WIS. STAT. § 645.68 (2009–2010).
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645. The Commissioner distinguished the statutes taxing insurance228 from
the tax collection statutes,229 arguing that the latter are not specifically
targeted at insurance.230 The Commissioner challenged the IRS’s assertion
that the Wisconsin injunction statute does not regulate the business of
insurance by pointing out that it is part of chapter 645 and specifically
references insurance liquidation proceedings.231 He alleged the third prong
of the McCarran-Ferguson analysis by saying that the IRS attempts to take
$700 million in “claims-paying resources” would impair the rehabilitation
proceeding.232 He also claimed that the Anti-Injunction Act is reverse
preempted by McCarran-Ferguson because it does not specifically relate to
insurance.233
When Federal District Court Judge Crabb for the Western District of
Wisconsin rendered her decision, she declined to address the injunction
motions, deciding only that McCarran-Ferguson divested the court of
jurisdiction.234 The judge agreed with the Commissioner that the powers to
tax “belong to the Congress; the IRS derives its authority from
Congress.”235 The court found that the Commissioner was not challenging
the power to tax, but only that McCarran-Ferguson requires the United
States to conform to state laws.236 Judge Crabb found that chapter 645
regulates the business of insurance, and that the application of the removal
statute would disrupt chapter 645’s “comprehensive rehabilitation
structure” and, therefore, “invalidate[], impair[], or supersede[]” Wisconsin
law.237 As a result, federal tax laws are not exempt from McCarranFerguson. She adopted the Commissioner’s argument that the rehabilitation
proceeding extends to the General Account to the extent it is a lender or
insurer of the Segregated Account. She stated that the Segregated Account
is not a separate corporation, concluding that “the whole point of the
rehabilitation is to rehabilitate Ambac Assurance Corporation.”238 In
addition, she elected to abstain under Burford because “Wisconsin has a
great interest in maintaining a uniform insurance rehabilitation process that
provides strong protection to policyholders.”239 Judge Crabb added that
“[f]ederal court review of the United States’ claims would be disruptive of
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
See, e.g., id. § 6331.
OCI Inj. Brief, supra note 225, at 10.
OCI Remand Brief, supra note 190, at 29.
OCI Inj. Brief, supra note 225, at 15.
Id. at 19.
Jan. 14 Order, supra note 105, at 2.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12 (alteration in original) (citing Hudson v. Supreme Enters., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-795,
2007 WL 2323380, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2007)).
238. Id. at 13.
239. Id. at 17 (citing Prop. & Cas. Ins. Ltd. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 936 F.2d 319, 323
(7th Cir. 1991)).
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the state’s rehabilitation goals and procedures.”240 She concluded that the
injunction is like a bankruptcy stay for insurance companies and that the
state rehabilitation court is “uniquely qualified to hear these claims.”241
Once the remand order was submitted, the Rehabilitation Court wasted
no time in confirming the Plan.242 The IRS attempted to appeal the remand
order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, but the Seventh
Circuit was quick to point out that its own rules prohibit the appeal of a
remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, saying: 243
This court has consistently reminded litigants that an order remanding
a case to state court based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a
defect in the removal procedure is not reviewable on appeal, whether or
not the decision is correct.244

The IRS filed a jurisdictional memorandum, claiming that this case
“implicates significant issues of federal statutory interpretation, federalism,
and the sovereign prerogatives of the United States.”245 The IRS maintained
that the remand was beyond the district court’s authority because of the
unique federal issues.246 The Commissioner argued that this was nonsense;
this appeal is a review of a federal court finding that it had no subject matter
jurisdiction.247
The IRS was not content to sit still with the remand ruling and sued in
federal court to enjoin the state court from enforcing the November 8, 2010
injunction, to enjoin the enforcement of the confirmation of the Plan, and to
void the November 8, 2010 injunction in so far as it affects the IRS.248 The
parties made similar arguments to those made in the previous federal court
proceeding. Judge Crabb was no more receptive to these arguments than
she had been previously. She dismissed the IRS’s complaint within ten days
of its filing, explaining that even though the posture had changed from a
removal to a claim for injunctive relief, “this distinction does not change
my earlier conclusions regarding jurisdiction.”249 The IRS has appealed to
240. Id. at 18.
241. Id. at 20.
242. See Decision and Final Order Confirming the Rehabilitator’s Plan of Rehabilitation, with
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac
Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Jan. 24, 2011).
243. Order, Nickel v. United States, No. 11-1158 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 2011).
244. Id. (citing Rubel v. Pfizer, Inc., 361 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2004); Phoenix Container, L.P. v.
Sokoloff, 235 F.3d 352, 354–55 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Continental Casualty Co., 29 F.3d 292, 293
(7th Cir. 1994)).
245. IRS Jurisdictional Memorandum at 8, Nickel, No. 11-1158 (7th Cir. Feb. 1, 2011).
246. Id. at 8, 17, 20.
247. Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance’s Response to United States’ Jurisdictional
Memorandum at 2, Nickel, No. 11-1158 (7th Cir. Feb. 1, 2011).
248. Amended Complaint at 1–2, United States v. Wis. State Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 767 F.
Supp. 2d 980 (W.D. Wis. 2011) (No. 11-CV-99).
249. United States v. Wis. State Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 767 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (W.D. Wis.
2011).
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the Seventh Circuit—this time hoping that it will not run aground on the
Seventh Circuit’s rules concerning appeals of remand orders. As of this
writing, briefing on the appeals in the Seventh Circuit is largely completed,
but no decision has been reached. .
The IRS returned to the state court, where it filed an appeal of the
confirmation of the Plan to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.250
Unfortunately for the IRS, the attorney who signed the notice of appeal was
not admitted in Wisconsin, and the Commissioner moved to dismiss its
appeal.251 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals granted the Commissioner’s
motion and dismissed the IRS’s appeal on May 3, 2011.252 The IRS has
petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review.253
If the Seventh Circuit turns the IRS away, this will have been a great
victory for McCarran-Ferguson. Ambac was able to draw an enormous
refund from the federal government on only its say-so. The federal
government, having provided the refund, must wait in line to get it back
after policyholders have been paid, with considerable doubt as to whether
the government will be paid at all. In the process, the Commissioner will
have successfully argued that the Rehabilitation Court had enough
jurisdiction over the General Account to stop the IRS, but not enough
jurisdiction over the General Account to stop the settlement with the CDS
Banks.254 The rehabilitator and Ambac Financial, along with various other
parties, have reached a settlement resulting in a new Plan of Reorganization
for Ambac Financial.255 This settlement involves, among other things, the
payment by Ambac Assurance to Ambac Financial for the use of net
operating losses.256 Nevertheless, if the parties cannot settle with the IRS,

250. Notice of Appeal at 1, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance
Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 8, 2011).
251. Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance’s Motion to Dismiss United States Appeal at 1, 10,
In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., App. No. 2011AP561 (Wis.
App. Mar. 25, 2011).
252. Opinion and Order at 5, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance
Corp., App. No. 2011AP987 (Wis. App. May 3, 2011).
253. Petition for Review at 1, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance
Corp., App. No. 2011AP987 (Wis. Jun. 1, 2011).
254. Compare OCI Remand Brief, supra note 190, at 13 (arguing that the Rehabilitation Court
had jurisdiction to enjoin claims on the General Account), with Ambac Assurance Corporation’s
Brief in Opposition to (i) Certain RMBS Investors’ Motion Seeking Expedited Relief and to
Modify Order for Temporary Injunctive Relief; and (ii) LVM Bondholders’ Emergency Motion to
Enjoin Consummation of the Proposed Settlement Between Ambac and Certain CDS
Counterparties at 22, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. May 20, 2010) (arguing that the Rehabilitation Court had no
jurisdiction over the General Account).
255. See Debtor’s Motion for an Order Further Extending Its Exclusive Period for Soliciting
Votes to Accept or Reject a Chapter 11 Plan at 3, In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-15973
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Debtor’s Motion].
256. See First Amended Disclosure Statement of Ambac Financial Group, Inc. at 41–54, In re
Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-15973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2011).
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nothing will be accomplished.257 While Ambac Financial has made a
proposal to the Department of Justice to settle its disputes with the IRS, at
the time of this writing, no settlement had been reached.258 The proposed
settlement includes, among other things, a payment by Ambac Assurance to
the IRS of $100 million.259
This drama is by no means over. The Commissioner is now grappling
with two new threats. First, Ambac Financial, in its public filings, has
raised the specter that the issuance of the surplus notes by the Segregated
Account might cause the deconsolidation for tax purposes of the various
Ambac entities, or, second, the surplus notes may be deemed equity,
causing a change of control, which might severely restrict the use of
Ambac’s net operating losses.260 This leads to the sobering realization that
the “rehabilitator is considering substantial amendments to the
rehabilitation plan and/or the initiation of rehabilitation proceedings with
respect to Ambac Assurance.”261 It appears that the IRS may have found
another way to fight back.
Meanwhile, Ambac Financial has asked the bankruptcy court to
adjudicate the merits of the disputed refund.262 The complaint was sent to
mediation, and there has been no result reached as of yet. Ambac Financial
has also filed a plan of reorganization with the bankruptcy court.263 This
plan threatens the Commissioner with the deconsolidation of the holding
company with the insurance subsidiaries if the holding company cannot
reach a settlement with the Commissioner.264 This would be accomplished
by converting the Chapter 11 proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation, or by
causing a change of control of Ambac Assurance by transferring its stock to
different entities.265 The Commissioner responded that “[t]he [Ambac
Financial] plan proposes to employ litigation to try to divert value from the
Segregated Account. The Rehabilitator will vigorously contest that
litigation.”266

257. Debtor’s Motion, supra note 255, at 3.
258. Id. at 4 n.1 (“[T]here can be no assurance that the IRS Dispute will be settled on the terms
described above, if at all, or as to the timing of any such settlement.”).
259. Id.
260. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 126–30 (May 10, 2011).
261. Id. at 11, 127, 130.
262. See Ambac IRS Bankruptcy Complaint, supra note 176, at 30.
263. Plan of Reorganization of Ambac Financial Group, Inc. at 26–27, In re Ambac Fin. Grp.,
Inc., No. 10-15973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2011).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Press Release, Rehabilitator Comments on AFGI Proposed Plan of Reorganization (July 7,
2011), available at http://ambacpolicyholders.com/. Subsequently, the OCI and Ambac Financial
settled their differences in exchange for a payment to the holding company. See Order, In re The
Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane
Cnty. Nov. 10, 2011).
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The Ambac Assurance rehabilitation is testing the McCarran-Ferguson
Act as never before since the authority of the bankruptcy court has been
posed against the authority of the Rehabilitation Court. The Commissioner
has been fighting the IRS and Ambac Financial for control of the
rehabilitation process. If these disputes with the IRS and Ambac Financial
can be resolved by settlements, prolonged litigation could potentially be
avoided; but if the disputes cannot be settled, the Commissioner may put
the entirety of Ambac Assurance into liquidation proceedings, permanently
subordinating any claims of the holding company or the IRS to claims of
policyholders.
V. WOULD DODD-FRANK MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act267
(Dodd-Frank) sets up a new Orderly Liquidation Authority.268 Dodd-Frank
allows insurance companies and a group whose largest subsidiary is an
insurance company to be designated for the new liquidation regime under
§ 203(a)(1)(C) of the statute.269 This regime may affect the non-insurance
entities that are part of insurance holding company families resulting in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) serving as receiver;
however, regulated insurance entities may only be taken into proceedings
under state law pursuant to § 203(e).270 The FDIC has backup authority to
take an insurance company into proceedings if a state regulator fails to do
so within sixty days, but Dodd-Frank is unclear as to whether the FDIC or
the state regulator would be the receiver in such proceedings.271 It says that
the receivership will be “under the laws and requirements of the State,”272
most of which require the state insurance regulator to be the receiver.273
Since the bulk of the activity in Ambac took place in regulated insurance
companies, there would likely be little difference. It is an interesting
question whether the federal government could have used its new powers to
force the General Account of Ambac into proceedings, but the Wisconsin
Commissioner would likely have full control over it once it got there.
CONCLUSION
Ambac poses some amazing challenges to the way we have
traditionally thought about insurance insolvency in this country. This case is
not only massive in size but also deals with a company that wrote highly
267. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
268. Id. §§ 201–217.
269. Id. § 203.
270. Id. § 203(e).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 7405 (McKinney 2005).
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specialized products that are more similar to those written by commercial
and investment banks. The Commissioner in Wisconsin used means to
tackle these gigantic crises that are different from traditional insurance
insolvency procedures. First, these proceedings have challenged the way we
think about priority, choosing to place some policyholders ahead of others.
Second, they have changed the way we view the rights of creditors to take
the value they would have received in liquidation. Third, they have adopted
an English-style model, previously unknown in this country, to transfer
policy liabilities. Fourth, the Ambac case has supercharged the force behind
McCarran-Ferguson’s reverse preemption of federal law.
Only time will tell if there will be enough claims-paying resources in
the Ambac entities to discharge its policy liabilities. Many of Ambac’s
exposures extend for decades. Uncertainty reigns in the market for
municipal credit, and everyone’s crystal ball is especially cloudy on the
future of residential real estate values.
The battle for control of Ambac is raging. The world will be watching
to see if the parties have made the right choices.

